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ABSTRACT
NON-GOVERNMENTAL EMERGENCY FOOD SERVICES:
A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF THE TERTIARY WELFARE SECTOR
This paper presents the findings of an exploratory study of
voluntarily organized emergency food centers in Baltimore. These
agencies comprise the heart of a tertiary welfare system that
provides basic survival supplies without a means test to the
needy who cannot obtain relief from traditional public or private
sources. Forty-one emergency food services were identified in
Baltimore and the heads of 37 of these agencies were interviewed
in depth. The findings indicated that a large and heterogeneous
population bad utilized emergency food agencies and that the
agencies generally met the requisites for a true safety-net
function - i.e., accessibility, non-bureaucratic structure, and
few eligibility rules. The data suggest strengthening the role
of voluntary charitable agencies in welfare reforms directed
at achieving universal safety-net coverage in the society.
NON-GOVERNMENTAL EMERGENCY FOOD SERVICES:
A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF THE TERITIARY WELFARE SECTOR
Despite the provisions of public social agencies and social
insurance programs, poverty is still a social reality of urban
America. Many individuals and families lack basic life-supporting
supplies and are unable, or unwilling in some cases, to obtain
these from existing public and voluntary agencies. In order to
survive the needy often turn to voluntarily organized emergency
food centers. These agencies constitute the heart of what we
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have defined as tertiary welfare sector. This paper presents the
findings of a systematic investigation of voluntary emergency
food services in Baltimore. The results afford some fresh data
from which to consider anew fundamental social policy issues,
such as the shape and substance of basic social protections in
the society, who should provide these - public or voluntary
sectors, church or state, and in what combination - and how such
benefits should be delivered.
The Tertiary Welfare Sector
Historical development aside, our current complex of social
welfare programs and services can be located within a tri-level
conceptual framework of social protections. Primary forms of
social protection consist mainly of the kinship and friendship
arrangements that exist in all societies. Very simply, in
time of need the first line of assistance is family and friends.
Both the Poor Laws of the past and present public assistance
regulations and policies have recognized these sources of support
through requirements that relatives accept responsibility for
their immediate kin before public aid is granted.
Secondary level social protections can be considered as the
various social insurance and public assistance programs found in
both modern and developing countries.1 Within these areas of
governmental responsibility, Shlakman2 has pointed out that
social insurance programs represent a first-line entitlement
because they minimize the use of a means test and correspondingly
reduce the exercise of arbitrary administrative discretion.
Categorical public assistance programs such as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, on the other hand, have served as a
second line to defense for persons not eligible for firstline
entitlements. Those persons ineligible for preferred treatment
"slip through the interstices of the categories...into the
safety-net for means-tested, second track, inferior treatment."3
These programs retain some of the residual character of Poor Law
treatment wherein recipients are viewed as undeserving and
constant survelliance is maintained to protect the society from
"welfare chisellers". A final resort - General Assistance - has
been left to state and local governments for the unemployed who
have exhaused or are not entitled to unemployment insurance, usually
single employable males and two parent families. Not surprisingly,
General Assistance programs have been the most marginally
financed and haphazardly applied forms of social protection.
Many needy persons unfortunately fall through our second
489
3.
tier social insurance programs and public assistance safty-net
because they are unable or unwilling to meet the requirements
of available programs or because coverage is simply not offered.
In order to survive they are forced to resort to a tertiary level
system of social protections. The tertiary system may be defined
as a network of voluntrrily organized social agencies and services
that can provide emergency relief and counseling without a means
test. Some familiar examples are church missions, and voluntary
sector agencies such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army. The
emergency food services that are the subjects of this paper lie at
the center of this system. The existence of emergency food
"agencies" is certainly not unique to the history of social welfare,
though the passage of Social Security legislation led to a decline
in their numbers. Still, some pre-Depression emergency food
agencies have persisted to the present and others have been more
recently re-created.
Conceptually, the definitions of a tertiary system of social
protection is less clear then primary or secondary forms.
Voluntary social agencies, such as those funded by United Way
organizations, for example, offer many useful social services
for the needy. To the extent that some of these services
include tangible relief or the type of counseling that concerns
itself with obtaining basic provisions for their clients, we
would include them in the tertiary system; With few exceptions,
however, such voluntary agencies do not define their functions
in terms of the provisions of tangible relief, and much of the
counseling is psychologically oriented.
Background of Study
The existence of a number of small, informally organized
emergency food "agencies" is a well known phenomenon to public
welfare service workers and others concerned with helping the
poor. Typically some of these agencies-are also listed in
Health and Welfare Council directories of community resources
and other such informational handbooks. But an accurate
accounting of the number of these agencies, identifying and
locating them, describing their organizational characteristics
and sergice populations has seldom been pursued. A survey of
.hurch and synagogue health and vielfare services conducted in
1975 by the Chicago Council for Community Services uncovered 27
scheduled and 65 "as-needed" emergency food services provided by
Chicago congregations. 4 For a city as large as Chicago
probably many more such services would be identified with further
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in-depth investigation. Aside from the Chicago study, an
extensive search of the literature failed to turn up any
other information on non-governmental emergency food services.
In Baltimore traditional public and private social agencies
have been unable to meet the emergency resource needs of the
citizenry for several years. A 1974 study conducted by the
Central Maryland Health and Welfare Council of emergency
financial assistance provided by Baltimore's voluntary social
agencies found that more than 20,000 requests for help had been
received by six major voluntary agencies, and that more than
11,000 referrals had been made to these agencies by the public
welfare department.5 A 1976 report of the Baltimore City
Department of Social Services-Emergency Services Center indicated
there had been an 18% decrease in the number of cases served by
the Emergency Services Center from 1975 to 1976, or 12,511 cases,
including requests for emergency food, because "grant allotments
have not been sufficient for the Center to adequately meet the
demand for services."6
In 1976 the Maryland Food Committee (OC), a church-supported
charitable agency dedicated to promoting policies and programs for
the reduction of hunger in Maryland, organized a loose coalition
of some fifteen Baltimore emergency food agencies that it partially
or fully funded. According to MFC figures, these agencies had
provided food or meals to an average of 7200 different individuals
per month over a seven month period. These data and the extent
of unmet need mentioned above formed the basis for an exploratory-
descriptive study to search out and identify voluntarily or-
ganized emergency food services in Baltimore as completely as
possible, and to study their service delivery characteristics,
including organizational structure, providers clientele, and
relationships with one another and other organizations and
institutions.
Methodology
Data collection centered around two main approaches. The
first dealt with identification of emergency food services (EFS's)
through a snowball search technique (described below). The second
dealt with studying the characteristics of the EFS's themselves
through a series of structured interviews with the persons in
charge of these agencies. For purposes of this study, emergency
food services were defined as units (individuals, groups, or
organizations) which provided emergency food or meals voluntarily
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on some regular, organized basis. The critical element in this
definition was the notion of a deliberately organized and
regular, as opposed to a haphazard or occasional, effort of a
provider to meet a community need for emergency food. In this
way large numbers of individuals and organizations, especially
churches, that occasionally give out some food to a needy comm-
unity member or congregant, were eliminated from the category of
emergency food service.
The identification process began with a dozen EFS's known to
the Maryland Food Committee and grew from there.7 Each EFS was
asked to generate a list of other places that they know of where
people went for emergency food or meals. These places were called
in turn, and those identifying themselves as EFS's were then asked
to identify other EFS's known to them, as above. A major
assumption of this approach was that no matter where the snowball
began, eventually the same emergency network would be traced out.
The search process continued until no new names appeared. System-
atic application of the snowball technique eventually produced a
firm list of 41 EFS's.
The final list of EFS's was checked out against other exist-
ing lists of emergency food services for purposes of external
validity, viz. a Health and Welfare Council list, the Maryland
Food Committee complete list, and a DSS Emergency Services list
and findings from a DSS survey of some 250 churches in Baltimore.
The project list included all of the EFS's mentioned in the other
files and added to them, with the exception of the church survey.
Here some 40 emergency food services had been identified beyond
the project list. A random sample of 10 of these names was
drawn and contacted. None of these contacts proved successful,
either because there was no response to repeated phone calls,
or because they did not meet the definitional criteria for EFS's
established by the project.
The research team was able to interview the directors of 37
of the 41 EFS's identified in the study using a lengthy structured
interview schedule. Interviews lasted between 2 and 3 hours and
were sometimes completed in more than one visit. The respondents
generally viewed these interviews positively despite their length.
Limitations
Before turning to the major findings of the project some of
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the limitations of the study bear mention. First, the size of
the tertiary sector and its client population in Baltimore is
probably under-represented as we cannot be certain that all of
the EFS's in the city proper were identified. It is also
possible that our methodology systematically ignored an emergency
services subsystem in one or more of Baltimore's ethnic communities
either because of differences in style of service delivery or a
lack of interconnectedness between the projectidentified network
and other emergency service networks.
Secondly, most of the EFS's that were studied did not have
extensive recordkeeping systems to draw on in answering the
interviewer's questions. The findings of the study are therefore
based upon respondent estimates and perceptions, subject to errors
in recollection, inaccuracy, and bias. In the case of questions
about historical origins and service delivery system information
at the inception of an EFS, retrospective bias was quite likely.
Finally, all of the information in the study was gathered
from service providers. Within the scope of this study a sample
of clients could not be adequately interviewed. However, client
perspectives of the EFS's would surely have added much to our
understanding of the tertiary welfare sector. The need for such
information points the way towards further study in the future.
Without a more extensive census of the client population and in-
depth interviews and observations of a client sample, the present
study remains as the best available information on tertiary food
agencies and their clientele to our knowledge.
Findings
The findings of this study have been assembled to highlight
the characteristics of Emergency Food Services "agencies" as
service delivery systems and the population that is served. Some
findings have necessarily been omitted so as not to dilute this
description.
Characteristics of the EFS Client Population:
Tertiary sector emergency food centers serve a sizeable
number of persons. The 37 EFS's in this study responded to
approximately 15,000 separate requests for food per month during
the past year (Table 1). (See Fn. for question of overlap.)
Stated differently, some 180,000 separate individuals and families,
or between 15 and 20% of the population of Baltimore, received
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food or meals from an EFS8 during a 12 month period. Most of these
clients were single individuals, but a substantial number of
families also received aid. If each family were considered to
have 4 members, the total number of persons per month benefiting
from EFS assistance would be 19,519, raising even higher the
percentage of Baltimore residents who received emergency food or
meals from EFS's. (Not to be forgotten is the unknown number of
needy persons who did not get help from any source).
TABLE 1
NUMBER AND TYPES OF CLIENTS SERVED BY EFS's PER MONTH
Types of Clients Number Served/Average Month
Individuals 14,115
Families 1,531
Total 15,466 (Case Units Served)
Of the clients who received aid from EFS's most were 1-2 -
time users, as opposed to periodic or regular users. One or
two time users represented persons requesting aid only once
or twice during the year, or clients who were generally able to
sustain themselves, but for some reasons did not have sufficient
reserve resources to help them get through an emergency situation.
Periodic users were defined as clients who had used the service
more then once or twice during the year, but less frequently
than once a month.
'These clients probably had enough resources to survive most of the
time, but lacked a stable enough incomes to remain independent
consistently. In addition to fluctuating circumstances,° this group
may also have included persons who did not live in Baltimore on a
regular basis, but who used the EFS services once a month or
better. The chronic use pattern was probably indicative of a
highly dependent group whose members had no regular incomes and/or
an inability to manage what resources they did have.
Table 2 indicates that although a substantial number-of EFS's
served periodic or regular users, for the majority of EFS's, more
than half of their clients fell into the 1 - 2 times user range.
High frequency responses regarding periodic and regular users, on
the other hand, in most cases fell into the lower percentage ranges.
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TABLE 2
FREQUENCY OF CLIENT USE PATTERN OF EFS's
% of Client Population Frequency of Use
1-2 Time Periodic Regular
0% 3 4 8
1-24 9 20 16
25-49 5 6 2
50-74 3 0 6
75-100 17 6 5
Totals 37 36* 37
*Missing data (N= 37) = "dont know" or "not applicable" responses
The client population of Baltimore's EFS's was also quite
heterogeneous. Contrary to expectations, it was composed of
mostly female-headed single parent families, rather than homeless
men. Two-thirds of the EFS's served a predominantly female client
population. A substantial number of EFS's served a predominantly
black population. As expected, most clients lived at a sub-
sistence level economically (at or below the poverty line), were
poorly educated, and bad problems with unemployment or under-
employment. At least a third of the EFS's also indicated that
they served a majority of clients suffering from alcoholism, and
a majority of EFS's served at least some deinstitutionalized
mental patients and prisoners. Drug use was a relatively in-
frequently seen client problem. Almost all of the EFS's served
mainly clients who were Maryland residents with stable (3 months
or more) local addresses.
When EFS's were categorized as to type of service provided,
e.g., Food only (27 EFS's), Meals Only (4 EFS's), or both food
and meals (6 EFS's), differing service patterns appeared. The
Food Only group, geographically located in neighborhoods, served
60% of the client population. The clients of the Food Only EFS's
appeared to consist mostly of neighborhood families, many of whom
were white, under and unemployed, and 1 or 2 time users. Meal
only EFS's served mostly a single male, black population of
periodic or regular users, with a high prevalence of alcoholism
and a greater degree of transiency. The client characteristics
of the Food/Meals combined group of EFS's as might be expected,
exhibited attributes of each of the pure types of EFS's.
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EFS Organizational & Service Delivery Characteristics:
Though the causal link cannot be stated directly, nearly 50%
of the EFS's indicated that at their inception Department of Social
Services (DSS) referrals to the EFS and service worker's requests
for help for clients were singificant factors in starting up
services. The present service referral pattern between DSS & the
EFS's supported this developmental relationship. As can be seen
in Table 3, nearly 50% of the EFS's received most of their clients
from the Department of Social Services, while two-thirds of the
EFS's referred "few" clients to DSS in turn.
TABLE 3
EFS REFERRAL PATTERN TO AND FROM BALTIMORE DSS
EFS Estimates of Number of Clients Total numbers of EFS's
Few Some Most
Estimates of
BPS Clients 26 9 2 37
sent to DSS
Estimates of
EFS Clients
Rec eived
From DSS 9 9 17 35*
*Missing data (N- 37) = "no answer" or "not applicable" responses
Service delivery problems with the welfare department con-
stituted a major reason that persons sought help from EFS's. These
included such difficulties as delays due to lost or stolen checks,
long waiting periods to begin receiving assistance, running out of
food before arrival of a DSS check, and ineligibility.
. The EFS's in the study seemed generally to represent a con-
.tinuation into the present of many pre-Depression types of. volun-
tary welfare organizations founded on the principles of charity.
The findings indicated that ninty percent of EFS's were church-
related, (Catholic & Protestant) either through auspices, major
sources of funding, or background of the providers, or all.
.Most of the EFS's were begun through the inspiration and efforts
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of single individuals who saw a community need and felt a moral
obligation to act to alleviate it. Eighty-five percent of the
individuals and groups responsible for beginning an EFS were
affiliated with religious institutions, primarily Catholic and
Protestant. Sixty-seven percent of the persons who began these
EFS's are still involved and the majority of providers were
affiliated in one way or another with an organized religious body,
either as clergy or lay people devoted to church work. Seventy-five
percent of the providers were college educated and white. One
was an MSW and three were BSW social workers. Most EFS's were
actually housed in churches or parish buildings (51%); the rest
chiefly operated out of row houses or store fronts which they
either owned or which had been donated to them. Over three-fourths
of the resources sustaining the tertiary sector were contributed by
religious institutions, especially Board members, staff, and funds.
EFS's largely operated without means tests or eligibility
rules of any sort. Most EFS's did not require proof of need (24%),
identification (16%), income (SZ) referral papers from some other
agency (11%), or residence in a particular geopgraphic locale (38%).
Most did not limit the number of times that a client could receive
emergency assistance within any specific time period (24%). Most
EFS's (70%) did ask for basic information from the clients, and
this seemed essentially to be accepted at face value. Some EFS's,
Particularly those serving meals, maintained behavioral require-
ments, such as being sober and not being prone to violence. In
general a simple indication of need by a client was sufficient to
bring forth whatever EFS resources could be mustered.
As service delivery systems, not only did EFS's refer few
clients to the welfare department, but also they tended not to
refer clients to other sources of assistance either. EFS's saw
as their primary aim the provision of direct help with few strings
attached and minimal bureaucratic delay. Fifty-nine percent of the
EFS's reported meeting direct emergency needs as the purpose of
their services, as opposed to such longer range goals as
rehabilitation, spiritual counseling, or social reform. The
literature suggests that client referrals to other agencies are
often a means for social agencies to select out a desireable
service population, and that referrals are frequently unsuccessful.1 0
In order to be able to provide direct emergency assistance, vir-
tually all of the EFS's offered other forms of assistance beyond
food or meals - such as shelter, clothing, and help with utilities
or rent payments and evictions.
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EFS's also proved to be geographically and temporally
accessible. The greatest concentration of EFS's was found to be
in the center of the city (40%), with another cluster (22%) in the
southern section of the city, and the rest spread around areas ad-
jacent to the inner city. Neighborhood-based EFS's tended to pro-
vide emergency food rather than meals, the latter being reserved
for the EFSTs in the central city. No emergency centers were
found in the outer parts of the city near the city/county line,
probably reflecting the greater affluence of suburban life.
Most EFS's indicated that they were open on a regular basis,
many for 6-7 days per week. Almost all had both regular business
hours (meaning they are open between 4 and 8 hours per day) and
some provision of service outside of regular hours. Several EFS's
indicated that people were around most of the time, frequently on
a 24 hour per day basis, to respond to requests made after hours.
In a few cases a phone number was posted so that clients could
phone for needed help when the facility was closed. Clients found
out about the EFS's mostly from other clients (72%) and from DSS.
In addition, most EFS's made at least some efforts to let people
know about themselves, usually by handing out a sign or by putting
notices in community bulletins.
Organizationally, the structure of the EFS's supported their
accessible service delivery style. In general the ERS's were non-
hierarchically structured. There was little specialization and
differentiation among the various roles of the providers accord-
ing to status (volunteer or paid or clergy), task, or education-
al background. The typical EFS had a small staff of about five
workers, most of whom were part-time or volunteers, with many
EFS providers doing this work as part of their parish duties.
Decision-making seemed to be at the direct service level; the
providers had a great deal of autonomy in the exercise of judge-
ment. Most EFS's had some sort of an advisory board structure to
oversee their programs, but boards seemed to play a subdued role
in the functioning of the centers.
Interestingly, most EFS's showed no development as organiza-
tional or service delivery systems. They tended to offer the same
range of services and served the same numbers of clients at the
time of interview as when they-began, and 21 of the 37 had been
in existence for three or more years. This non-developmental
dimension of the EFS's may reflect the truly voluntary caste
of the agencies, as well as their limited resources and direct
assistance goals. The EFS providers were either volunteers or
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"professional poor" (i.e. students, clergy etc.) for whom the work
was only a part-time occupation. Since the providers' livelihoods
were not dependent upon the EFS's, nor was that a fundamental rea-
son for their involvement, organizational aggrandizemen apparent-
ly was neither a manifest nor a latent goal.
As service delivery systems EFS's thus exhibited many of the
characteristics necessary for providing last resort social pro-
tections in the society. We would characterize the major requisites
of a true safety-net service as: willingness and ability to accept
all who seek its provisions; minimization of bureaucracy; provision
of direct, tangible assistance; accessibility; and commitment to
service by the providers.
However, EFS's could not furnish protections adequately.
While EFS's seemed essentially to be accepting of all who needed
help, they could not provide help for all who needed it. Their
chief impediment was lack of resources. In many ways EFS's
operated marginally, much like the clients they served. Most
did not have annual budgets, and where total operational worth
could be estimated, including in-kind donations of facilities,
staff, and goods, few of the budgets exceeded an annual value
of $10,000. Most EFS's had np stable source of supplies, in-
cluding food and other necessities, as well as income. Many
closed their doors temporarily when their resources were exhausted.
EFS's therefore operated with a great deal of daily uncertainty.
In such a system clients could never be sure that emergency
assistance would be available. One wonders further about needy
persons who never learned about these services, or who came only
to find the larder empty, but who had already been denied assist-
ance from the public sector.
Discussion
The findings of this study offer some fresh data with which
to re-examine a number of familiar and fundamental social policy
questions: the matter of universalistic vs, selective services;
the place of charity in social welfare; the professionalization
and bureaucratization of social welfare; and publicvoluntary
welfare sector relationships. Our discussion of the findings will
attempt to touch on these matters without going too far beyond the
exploratory material that has been gathered.
First of all, the study has documented the existence of
serious gaps in structure of social protections provided by
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governmental programs. The fact that 15% or more of the citizens
of a major urban center like Baltimore resorted to non-government-
al emergency food services at least once in the course of a year
suggests that the substance and delivery of existing social pro-
visions is highly inadequate. We assume that Baltimore is not
unique. Explanations for this unfortunate state of affairs are,
of course, multiple. Among the most obvious are: the low level
of public assistance grants; the categorical eligibility re-
quirements of public assistance programs that render many persons
ineligible; the lack of publicly provided emergency resources
1l;
the inaccessibility of the resources that do exist; administrative
delays and bureaucratic mismanagement.
A significant number of the users of emergency food services
were welfare recipients. This finding at least partially explains
how people survive on inadequate welfare grants. Although the
tertiary welfare sector is not formally legitimated by the archi-
tects of social policy, in practice, the poor and those who assist
the poor in public a encies frequently turned to EFS's for sub-
sistence resources.11 These organizations responded where public
services failed because of their accessibility, avoidance of means
tests, commitments to direct service, and non-bureaucratic styles.
Their marginality, however, though conducive to these positive as-
pects of service delivery, also limited their capacity to offer re-
liable and w-idespread emergency-provisions. This straightforward
point bears further elaboration.
The evolution of the modern welfare state has been a history
of the gradual transfer of welfare responsibility from private in-
dividuals, voluntary associations, and religious institutions to
public auspices. Accompanying this transfer we have witnessed a
shift in underlying societal values from welfare as charity to
welfare as legal entitlement. We have also moved haltingly towards
universalistic systems of social protections. Since the public
sector alone has the resources to guarantee adequate and stable
social protections, the voluntary sector has largely accepted this
reality. Nevertheless, the findings of this study have demonstrated
that the voluntary sector is still significantly involved in the
business of giving relief.
The tertiary sector's ability to assist many of the persons
who slip through the public sector safety-net is bound up with
its charitable value ideal. The state as a political body must
establish its legal entitlements in a manner consistent with
socially acceptable values. It therefore must decide who is
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deserving or undeserving of benefits, that is, who is eligible and
in this society the criterion generally rest on a judgement of
ability to contribute to the community through labor. Voluntary
welfare institutions can respond to need alone and offer assis-
tance out of simple concern for humanity to all who ask without
proof of worthiness.
Charity as a value has been demeaned in this society with the
ascendance of the concept of legal entitlement. The loss of a
charitable base for welfare has resulted in a corresponding loss
of flexibility in the provision of social protections. A universa-
list system of social protections, that is, a noncategorical non
means-tested approach, requires a societal commitment to the values
of both (social) Justice and mercy (to paraphrase the Prophet Micah).
In the development of social welfare programs for a complex in-
dustrial society, mercy and the humanitarian impulse have been re-
legated to the uncertainties of a marginal, tertiary welfare system.
Nor has professionalization of the charitable impulse in the
form of social work been sufficient to ensure the delivery of con-
crete services to the poor either in the voluntary or the public
sectors. Instead, social work practice in both spheres has
stressed the development of rehabilitativ3and social treatment
technologies in the delivery of services. Additionally, with-
in the public sector bureaucratic imperatives have frequently
stifled social work's humanitarian value ideals14 such that, on
balance, social workers have often behaved merely as an exten-
sion of the political will of governmental functionaries.
The findings of this study have similarly suggested incompati-
bility between the practical implementation of the charitable
value ideal and its professionalization. Professional social
workers were notably absent from the operations of tertiary sector
EFS's. The staff members of the EFS's seemed to have a strong
"mission orientation", that is, a commitment to simply meet needs
as presented by clients, and a willingness to accept the status of
"professionsal poor". By way of contrast, professional social
workers who do serve the poor usually work within large bureau-
cratic organizations where relatively high salaries, professional
culture, and rehabilitative practice modalities supply primary
sources of gratification. None of the above is necessarily
surprising. It points up the limitations of professions, whether
social work or some other human service profession, in delivering
basic social provisions.
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Conclusion
The thrust of modern social policy has been towards the deve-
lopment of universalist state-supported and state-delivered social
protections. Recent welfare reform proposals have included the
notion of cashing out inkind benefits so as to consolidate and
simplify the administration of public assistance. Clearly social
protections would be buttressed and the safety-net extended thrcugh
a guaranteed income scheme of some sort, through establishment of
the principle of need alone as the criterion for aid, and through
increases in existing grant levels. But just as clear is the
reality that universalist social protections under state auspices
will always be imperfect; at the least, some segment of the pop-
ulation will always slip through the safety-net by exhausting
their state-supported social provisions or through bureaucratic
inflexibility. Therefore, present and future costs of hunan
suffering compel us to attend to strengthening non-governmental
relief-giving capacities as well The question is how to fortifv
the tertiary welfare system through public y9licy initiatives
without destroying its voluntary character.
Though lack of space prevents full exploration of the com-
plexities here, we would propose that social protections could be
meaningfully expanded by: (a) increasing the availability of
emergency in-kind supplies for the needy, such as food and clothing;
(b) through government surplus commodities and governent incentives
to private industry to furnish additional resources; (c) utilizing
the tertiary sector to distribute these publically supplied in-kind
benefits. Rather than the elimination of in-kind provisions through
cashing them out, these should be utilized as a kind of inflation-
proof, last-resort protection. This form of legitimation for the
role that the tertiary welfare sector is already performing would
reduce its marginality and take advantage of its assets. (The re-
sources of the tertiary sector would also be increased, of course,
by a re-orderin of priorities in the voluntary/philanthropic
sector itself towards meeting fundamental human needs).
The assignment of a relief role to non-governmental agencies,
partially subsidized by government, would have to be accompanied
by a search for fiscal accountability that would not unduly limit
the autonomy of the voluntary parties in the relationship. An
indirect system of improving tax incentives for contributors to
tertiary system agencies would allow for the most aut Pomy,
but also the most uncertainty about secure resources. Contractual
arrangements between public and tertiary welfare agencies, along
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the lines of purchase of service agreements, might also be con-
sidered. Such agreements would offer more resource security but
decrease voluntary agency autonomy. At the very least, tertiary
sector agencies could receive government surplus commodities to
add to their stock of emergency supplies with minimal account-
ability requirements. Even a modest governmental-tertiary sector
program along these lines would improve the safety-net function of
both.
Summary
The findings of this study of non-governmental emergency food
services have demonstrated that a tertiary welfare sector in Bal-
timore serves as an emergency safety-net for a large proportion of
its citizens. By the same token, the public welfare agency in
Baltimore, the intended repository of the safety-net function for
the community, often is not adequate in this emergency capacity.
It has been proposed that the unique characteristics of the tertiary
sector delivery system, founded on a charitable ideal, enable it
to perform its "agency-of-last-resort" function. However this
function is hampered by the severe resource limitations of tertiary
agencies.
The development of broad-based social protections in the
society would be enhanced by a policy of deliberate cooperation
between the public and voluntary welfare sectors to achieve these
ends. The voluntary sector has not generally been viewed as hav-
ing a significant contribution to make in meeting basic social
needs. But the state cannot achieve these ends by itself because of
its political character. At the least, a simple transfer of in-
kind provisions, such as surplus commodities, from governmental to
voluntary sector agencies for distribution would be a step to-
wards guaranteeing basic social protections for all. It would also
be a way of giving recognition to the principle that the strength
of a pluralistic society lies in bringing together creatively the
separate agencies of justice and mercy without forming them into
a singular monolithic institution.
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